Hossein Mohammadi; Abd-al-Rasoul Kashfi; Hassan Ebrahimi
Volume 5, Issue 1 , October 2014, , Pages 109-131
Abstract
One of the important issues in philosophy of mind is mind-body relationship. In this regard, there are two views: Monism and Dualism. Based on Dualism, human beings have two aspects: physical body and immaterial mind; on the contrary Monism holds that there is only one kind of ultimate substance by which ...
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One of the important issues in philosophy of mind is mind-body relationship. In this regard, there are two views: Monism and Dualism. Based on Dualism, human beings have two aspects: physical body and immaterial mind; on the contrary Monism holds that there is only one kind of ultimate substance by which the human beings are constituted.
Though Mullasadra and John Hick, from two different philosophical traditions, both believe in the two aspects, as this article wants to prove, Mullasadra’s view is monistic, however not in its prominent meaning in philosophy of mind; his view is a novel one based on his philosophical views. John Hick is a substantial dualist. He advocates his view at the cost of rejection of mind-brain identity theory and also epiphenomenalism. Nevertheless, aside his view on mind-body relationship, most of his theories are similar to Mullasadra’s theory, namely, believing in two different aspects for human beings, mind emergence procedure, mind immateriality, human physical initial creation, interrelation of mind and body, and their effects on each other
